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Insider trading is a complex issue that involves both corporate and criminal law. 
Since the introduction of civil penalties, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) has only pursued one civil proceeding against insider trading. 
ASIC prefers criminal proceedings for their deterrent effects. This paper examines
various features of Australian convicted insider trading cases from 2004 to the end 
of 2015 and provides a broad overview of the distribution of these cases. Further, 
this paper assesses the consistent application of sentencing factors and the 
determination of criminalities of different kinds of insider trading activities. Finally,
this paper proposes renaming current insider trading laws to ‘dealing with 
privileged information’.
I INTRODUCTION
It is commonly held that insider trading undermines investor confidence in market 
fairness and market integrity. Investors’ confidence in the integrity of the market 
and in the efficiency of its regulator is of considerable significance to the 
attractiveness of a stock market. Investors expect the market to be fair and reward 
innovation, diligence and talent. Therefore, the public expects ASIC to protect 
them from insider trading because: (1) insiders have informational advantages 
that cannot be competed away; and (2) investors believe they are the victims of 
insider trading. 
Australian insider trading laws prohibit insiders from trading on, 1 procuring 
trading on, or communicating inside information (tipping) relating to any 
financial products that are tradable on a financial market,2 subject to various 
                                                          
* Independent researcher, Ph.D. (Deakin). This paper is excerpted from the author’s PhD thesis 
titled ‘The Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws in Australia: Reform Proposals’.
1 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s1043A. Section 1043A is the main insider trading provision 
currently. This provision has been in effect since 11 March 2002. Section 1043A is broadly the 
same as s 1002G of the previous Corporations Law.
2 Ibid s1042A.
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exceptions and defences. When acting on this information, insiders must know or 
ought reasonably to know that such information is not generally available and, if 
it were made known to the public, would have a material effect on the price of 
the financial product.3 For convicted insider trading in Australia, the current
maximum penalty is imprisonment for 10 years, or a fine of the greater of (i) 
4,500 penalty units ($945,000);4 or (ii) three times the total value of the benefits 
obtained, or both.5 In civil penalty proceedings, the maximum civil penalty is 
$200,000 for an individual.6
This paper analyses various features of all convicted insider trading cases from 
2004 to the end of 2015. During the examined period, 37 individuals were 
convicted and sentenced,7 of which nine (29.7%) were jailed. In other words, for
every ten convicted insider trading offenders, about three served full-time 
                                                          
3 Ibid.
4 One penalty unit is $210. See Penalty Units, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/enforcement-action/penalty-units>.
5 Corporations Amendment (No 1) Act 2010 (Cth) Section 20 increased the penalties for criminal 
breaches of the insider trading and market misconduct provisions. The maximum penalty was 
increased from 5 years imprisonment and a $20,000 fine in 2010.
6 1317G(1B): The maximum penalty is $1 million for a body corporate. The civil penalty for insider 
trading offences was introduced in 2001. Also, if a court finds that insider trading has occurred, 
the court may make an order to direct a person to refrain from doing a specific act, or to cancel 
his/her Australian Financial Services Licence. Further, directors convicted of insider trading are 
automatically disqualified from managing a company for five years. Unlike director 
disqualification orders, it is optional for the court and ASIC to suspend or cancel an Australian 
Financial Services Licence held by the convicted insider trading offender. See Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth), Section 920A, section 1043O, S206B, Section 920A, Section 920(B). So far, among 
the 18 convicted market intermediaries, two were banned: Colin Hebbard and Rene Rivkin.
7 R v Hannes [2002] NSWSC 1182 (Hannes’ case); (Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 
373); R v Rivkin [2003] NSWSC 447 (Rivkin’s case); R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7 (Rivkin’s 
appeal); R v Doff [2005] NSWSC 50 (Doff’s case); R v Doff [2005] NSWCCA 119 (Doff’s 
appeal); R v Frawley [2005] NSWSC 585 (Frawley’s case); R v Hall [2005] NSWSC 890 (Hall’s 
case); R v McKay [2007] NSWSC 275 (McKay’s case); R v Woodland [2007] VCC 1736 
(Woodland’s case); R v Panchal [2009] QDC 105 (Panchal’s case); R v O’Reilly [2010] VSC 
138 (O’Reilly’s case); R v Stephenson [2010] NSWSC 779 (Stephenson’s case); R v De Silva 
[2011] NSWSC 243 (De Silva’s case); R v Dalzell [2011] NSWSC 454 (Dalzell’s case); R v 
Bateson [2011] NSWSC 643 (Bateson’s case); R v Hartman [2010] NSWSC 1422 (Hartman’s 
case); Hartman v DPP (Cth) [2011] NSWCCA 261 (Hartman’s appeal); R v O’Brien [2011] 
NSWSC 1553 (O’Brien’s case); R v Rietbergen, R v Levi (Unreported, District Court of New 
South Wales, Andrew J, 5 December 2012) (Rietbergen & Levi’s case); R v Zhu [2013] NSWSC 
127 (Zhu’s case); Western Australia v Hebbard [2013] WASCSE 71 (Hebbard’s case); R v 
Lindskog ([2013] VSC CR-12-02200) (Lindskog’s case); R v Tan (District Court of New South 
Wales, 17 April 2013) (Tan’s case); DPP v Graham [2014] VCC, Case No CD-13-00368, 22 
May 2013 (Graham’s case); R v Glynatsis [2012] NSWSC 1551 (Glynatsis’ case); R v Glynatsis 
[2013] NSWCCA 131 (Glynatsis’ appeal); R v Gay (Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 
Porter J, 23 August 2013) (Gay’s case); R v Khoo (District Court of New South Wales, 12 July 
2013) (Khoo’s case); Khoo v R [2013] NSWCCA 323 (Khoo’s appeal); Commonwealth Director 
of Public Prosecutions v Hill and Kamay [2015] VSC 86 (Hill & Kamay’s case); R v Joffe, R v 
Stromer [2015] NSWSC 741 (Joffe & Stromer’s case); R v Farris [2015] WASC 251 (Farris’ 
case); Kamay v The Queen [2015] VSCA 296 (Kamay’s appeal). Judgments of the following 
cases are not available to the public: Mr Ang; Mr Reddell; Mr Luong; Mr Turner; Mr Breen; Mr 
Jordinson; Mr Farris; Mr Sweetman.
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custodial imprisonment. The other 26 individuals were sentenced with intensive 
correction orders, community service orders, good behaviour bonds or fines. 
In terms of the jurisdiction in which these cases were heard, the majority (65%) 
were heard in New South Wales (NSW). The rest of the cases examined were
heard in various states: six in Victoria, three in Queensland, three in Western 
Australia and one in Tasmania. The high conviction numbers in NSW can be 
attributed to the following two reasons: (1) traders in Sydney have ample insider 
trading opportunities; or (2) courts in NSW take a more aggressive approach to
convicting insider trading offenders. Due to limitations of resources, the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions can only prosecute appropriate 
cases when there are reasonable prospects of securing a conviction, and regulators
probably have greater chances of securing criminal convictions against insider 
trading offenders in NSW. 
Section 2 of this paper provides a broad understanding of various distributions of 
these cases. Features examined in this analysis include the distribution of these 
cases by the year of the first occurrence of alleged insider trading, the distribution 
of these cases by the year of their final judgment, the time gap between the 
occurrence of alleged insider trading and the delivery of its final judgment, types 
of insider trading offences, trading opportunities, and offenders’ employment at 
the time of insider trading.
In Australia, the principle of consistency requires consistency in the application 
of the relevant legal principles. Hence, similar approaches should create similar 
outcomes. Section 3 examines the consistent application of sentencing factors and 
the determination of criminalities of different kinds of insider trading activities. 
II DISTRIBUTIONS OF ALL CONVICTED INSIDER TRADING
CASES IN AUSTRALIA FROM 2004 TO 2015
 
A Distribution of Cases
Figure A presents the distribution of all convicted insider trading cases by the 
year of the first occurrence of the alleged trading. If an offence took place over a 
period of time, this study takes the date when such offence first appeared. The 
graph shows that the majority of the alleged insider trading activities (73%) 
occurred after 2006, with the highest number (six) of convicted cases taking place 
in 2006. Out of 37 alleged insider trading activities, 10 trades happened before 
2006, which is about one convicted insider trading activity per year between 1996 
and 2005; two trades occurred in 2009 and 2012, three trades in 2010, and five in 
2011 and 2013. 
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Figure A: Distribution of Insider Trading Cases Studied by Year of First 
                 Occurrence of Alleged Trading
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that began in 2006 in the United States and 
spread around the world, peaked in 2008. Australian’s financial market was 
heavily affected by the crisis. For example, in O’Brien’s case,8 the offender 
traded on insider trading information with the hope to boost his mother’s 
superannuation fund, which was severely affected by the GFC. As the market 
deepened, there were more opportunities for insider trading as transactions 
became more sophisticated and more insiders had access to otherwise confidential 
information. 
Moreover, the sharp increase in the number of cases convicted from 2006 
onwards clearly indicates that ASIC began to take a more proactive stance on 
prosecuting insider traders around that time. Since 1 August 2010, ASIC has 
assumed responsibility for market supervision and real-time surveillance of 
trading from the Australian Securities Exchange. The market began to pick up in 
2011, and a large number of deals were negotiated in that year, meaning that more 
insider trading opportunities were available around that time.9 Figure B shows 
the distribution of all convicted insider trading cases from 2004 to 2015 by year 
of their final judgment.
 
                                                          
8 O’Brien’s case [32].
9 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Annual Report 2010–11 (10 October 2011), 
63. 
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Figure B: Distribution of all Convicted Insider Trading Cases by Year of                   
                      Final Judgment
Figure B shows that regulators did not convict anybody of insider trading in 2006,
but convicted ten individuals of insider trading in 2013 (the highest number of 
convictions in a single year). During the GFC, ASIC’s primary focus was to 
stabilise the Australian market and protect investors. In a study of insider trading,
Ramsay and Lei considered 79 insider trading cases spanning from 1973 to 25 
August 2013.10 In that paper, they concluded that the number of insider trading 
cases had been increasing over time.11 However, ASIC Commissioner Cathie 
Armour rejected the idea that rising numbers of guilty findings reflects increasing 
illegal activity; as she puts it, it is more a reflection of ASIC’s focus on insider 
trading. Ms Armour went on to explain that ‘increased guilty findings … are … 
due to the expertise and faster systems.’12 The Commissioner stated that ASIC 
was confident that with the expertise it had developed and the right combination 
of staff, where appropriate, it could act on information within hours or days of 
suspicious trading, whereas previously it could have taken months.13 Figure C
presents the time gap between dates of occurrence of alleged insider trading and 
dates of the delivery of their final judgments. 
 
                                                          
10 Victor Lei and Ian Ramsay, ‘Insider Trading Enforcement in Australia’ (2014) 8 Law and 
Financial Markets Review 214.
11 Ibid.
12 Matthew Raggatt, ‘Facing Deep Cuts, ASIC Denies Insider Trading Boom’, The Canberra Times
(online) 17 May 2014 <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/facing-deep-cuts-asic-
denies-insider-trading-boom-20140516-zrfko#ixzz3kouhCT2x>.
13 Ibid.
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Figure C: Time Gap Between the Date of the Occurrences of Alleged Insider 
Trading and the Date of the Delivery of Final Judgment
Where the alleged conduct of insider trading took place over time, this study took
the date of the first occurrence of such trading. In addition, where the exact date 
the alleged trading took place is not available, but the month is known, this study
took the first day of that month. Figure C shows that twelve cases were finalised 
within two years, and only one case was concluded within one year after the 
occurrence of the insider trading. Besides, eight out of 37 cases (22%) took more 
than five years to finish, but only two cases were finalised in the four to five years 
range. The graph above clearly demonstrates that most cases took more than one 
year but less than four years to finalise. 
The average time for the regulator to successfully conclude a criminal proceeding 
against an insider trading offender is about 1315 days, which is roughly three 
years and seven months. The successful prosecution of Simon Hannes is the 
longest trial to date, which took more than a decade to finalise (4270 days). 
Without Hannes’ case, the average time for a successful prosecution of insider 
trading is 1199 days (three years and three months) over the 10-year examination 
period. Mr Hannes abused the appeal process to plead reduction of his penalties,
resulting in two trials, two convictions and two appeals. The rejection of Mr 
Hannes’ application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia in 
2008 indicated the end of this long-fought legal battle.14
ASIC claimed that, having assumed the power of market surveillance in 2010, it 
would be able to act swiftly on insider trading, and it has since improved its 
detection technology.15 For cases that occurred after 2011, data shows that, on 
average, ASIC took about two years and eight months to conclude a successful 
criminal proceeding. This reduction in time is a significant improvement on the 
                                                          
14 Hannes v DPP (No. 2) (2006) 205 FLR 217.
15 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ‘ASIC’s Next Generation Market 
Surveillance System Commences’ (Media Release, 25 November 2013) 
<http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2013-releases/13-316mr-asics-
next-generation-market-surveillance-system-commences/>.
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regulator’s part compared to the total average time taken to prosecute cases over 
the time frame examined, which is three years and seven months. The natural 
complexity of carrying out criminal proceedings creates the long gap, including 
the difficulties in detecting insider trading offences and resolving appeals initiated 
by defendants or regulators. In general, courts have acknowledged the delay as 
reasonable due to the challenges involved in investigating insider trading. 
B Details of Alleged Insider Trading
Australian insider trading laws prohibit anyone from trading on privileged 
information, procuring someone else to trade on privileged information, and 
communicating privileged information (tipping). Commonly, defendants were 
alleged to have contravened the insider trading laws once, while occasionally 
defendants faced claims of 20 or more contraventions. Figure D shows the 
distribution of alleged insider trading activities.
Figure D: Distribution of Alleged Insider Trading Activities
Figure D shows that 33 (89%) cases involved a single contravention, and four
cases involved a mixture of two contraventions (buying and tipping, or buying 
and selling). In 22 cases (59%), trading (buying and selling) was the only activity 
subject to the insider trading claim. Among the other fifteen cases, six cases 
involved procuring others to trade on privileged information, five cases related to 
communication of privileged information (tipping), two cases involved both 
buying and tipping, and two cases involved buying and selling financial products. 
From Figure D, it can be concluded that the majority of convicted insider trading 
offenders were motivated to make profits from purchasing shares. Another 
explanation is that trading activities prior to announcements of takeover deals 
might be easier to identify and prosecute. Figure E shows the distribution of 
trading opportunities.
1 Trading Opportunities
Figure E indicates that 22 share-purchasing activities (almost 60%) were 
associated with takeover deals. From the remaining 15 cases, six involved selling 
shares due to corporations’ poor financial performance, three were related to 
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profitable business arrangements, two involved employees trying to take 
advantage of their employers’ trading intentions, one related to the release of 
positive finance reports, and three cases concerned other reasons, such as the 
announcement of a major sell-down of shares by a corporation’s major 
shareholders and directors, and trading on highly confidential official documents. 
It is found that insider trading incidences commonly coincided with takeover 
activities; this observation is supported by the results presented in Figure E.
Figure E: Insider Trading Opportunities
To understand the positive correlation between insider trading and takeover deals, 
a brief explanation of the acquisition process in stock markets is a prerequisite. 
When a firm acquires another entity, the acquiring company typically pays a
substantial premium to acquire control of the target company. This premium is 
treated as a small incentive to encourage shareholders of the target company to 
sell their shares to the acquiring company. Consequently, the target company’s 
stock price goes up. Insiders tend to purchase shares of the target company before 
the announcement of the proposed takeover and speculate its share price to rise 
later. 
People involved in preparing takeovers, including senior corporate insiders and 
the employees of financial advisors, gain access to the acquisition information 
well before their formal announcements and this information is classified as 
privileged information. Exposure to this information alone may induce greedy 
insiders to misuse this information illegally to enrich themselves, increasing the 
chances that they will commit insider trading offences. The next section explores 
the employment of convicted insider trading offenders at the time of alleged 
insider trading. 
2 Likely Insider Trading Offenders
All cases examined here involved individual offenders. This study groups 
offenders into three categories: corporate insiders, market intermediaries and 
others. ‘Corporate insiders’ include all employees and directors of any 
corporation; ‘market intermediaries’ involve those who are participating in 
financial transactions and have access to privileged information, such as research 
analysts and accountants; and ‘others’ include tippees, short-term technology 
22
1
6
3 2 3
takeover positive finance
report
poor finance
performance
profitable
business
arrangement
brokers trade
on employers'
intention
others
2017                                         … SENTENCING FACTORS IN INSIDER TRADING CASES 115
 
 
consultants, and any person who happened to know the privileged information. 
Tippees are generally friends and family members.
Figure F: Offender’s Employment at the Time of Alleged Insider Trading
As shown in Figure F, 18 offenders (49%) were market intermediaries and 12
offenders were corporate insiders. The seven other offenders included an 
employee of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, a computer consultant, a real 
estate agent to whom was made known a piece of privileged information 
involuntarily during a business meeting, and several relatives and friends as 
tippees. 
The corporate insiders are further divided into directors, middle management and 
junior employees. Surprisingly, there were no junior employees convicted for 
insider trading offences; this might partly be because of the difficulties involved 
in proving a junior employee has committed insider trading. Not only do junior 
employees have limited access to inside information, but also their trading values 
are usually small and hardly traceable in the securities market. 
In the corporate insiders group, 11 out of 12 were company directors, and the 
most high-level executive convicted of insider trading in Australia was a
chairman (Mr Gay). This result is not surprising, as directors receive and review 
insider information about their companies and other business partners from time 
to time as part of their responsibilities, thus creating more opportunities for them 
to take advantage of this knowledge to make profits or avoid losses from trading 
in stock markets. Additionally, compared to employees, directors stand to gain 
greater financial advantages in dealing with privileged information, which are 
likely to draw more attention from the regulator. 
Only one medium-ranked manager was convicted. This was not because middle-
ranked managers do not have a great deal of access to insider trading information, 
but rather because middle-ranked managers may be more concerned with the 
future of their career. 
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III CONSISTENCY EVALUATION: ASSESSING THE APPLICAT-
ION OF EACH SENTENCING FACTOR
After examining various features of insider trading cases, this section carries out 
a horizontal analysis of each sentencing factor by analysing the application of 
each factor across different kinds of sentencing options.16 In addition, it examines
the validity of different claims and interpretations made by courts and prosecutors
in relation to studied insider trading convictions, such as the claim that the 
criminality of tipping is higher than that of trading. 
A Horizontal Analysis of Sentencing Factors
Insider trading offenders are to be sentenced in accordance with Part IB of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Division 2 in Part IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) sets 
out general sentencing principles when passing sentence in relation to federal 
offences, particularly in section 16 (A). The sentencing factors examined in this 
section is a combination of the list provided in s16(A)(2) and Overland’s work.17
1 Profit Made Versus Money Invested
It is consistent that the amount of profit made and the amount of money invested 
involved in each offence plays a role in assessing the objective criminality of the 
offence. However, it is worth noting that ‘these particular values are simply two 
among many considerations relevant to determining the seriousness of the 
offending.’ 18 Some cases considered the profit derived as the appropriate 
determinant of the objective criminality of the offending,19 but other cases held 
that the amount of money invested provides a better indicator of the objective 
criminality of the offending.20 Generally speaking, when these two factors are 
significantly different, courts have taken the view that the higher amount is a more 
accurate indicator of an offender’s criminality. When these two figures are 
similar, courts tend to take both values into account and do not comment on which 
factor is more accurate in estimating an offender’s criminality.21
When the amount of money invested is higher than the profit derived, prosecutors 
have argued and courts have accepted that the amount of money invested is a 
product of design,22 that ‘the damage to the integrity of the market occurs when 
                                                          
16 Non-custodial sanctions, suspended sentences, Periodic Detention Orders and Intensive 
Correction Orders, imprisonment, and civil proceedings
17 Juliette Overland, ‘Towards Better Deterrence of Securities Fraud: Promoting Consistency in 
Sentencing Insider Traders’ (2008) 5 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 191.
18 Kamay’s appeal 296 [28].
19 Stephenson’s case; de Silva’s case; Hartman’s case; Hill & Kamay’s case.
20 Doff’s case; Lindskog’s case; Dalzell’s case; Glynatsis’ case; Zhu’s case.
21 Woodland’s case; Joffe & Stromer’s case.
22 Glynatsis’ appeal [51]–[53].
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the investment is made’,23 and also that the criminality of an insider trading 
offender could not be considered as trivia if he/she ventured but lost.24
The profits generated become the more appropriate indicator of criminality in two 
scenarios: (i) when an offender sells shares to avoid losses; and (ii) when an
offender trades in the derivatives market. An example of the first scenario is
Stephenson’s case. Since the offender did not invest any money in his attempted 
insider trading, the amount of losses avoided became the more suitable indicator 
of Mr Stephenson’s criminality. In the second scenario, some offenders traded in 
derivatives markets, and some traded in the open stock market. For offenders who 
traded in the open stock market, the amount of money invested can be considered
an accurate indicator of their criminality, as it is a product of design. However, 
for offenders who trade in the derivatives market, due to the nature of these 
financial products, the amount of profit made provides a relatively accurate view 
of the size of their trading.25 Mr Kamay traded in the margin FX trading market, 
which is a high-leveraged market. In other words, Mr Kamay was able to make a 
large profit on a very small investment.26
Despite this discrepancy in the criteria used to determine criminality, the ultimate 
question courts were trying to answer is which factor reflects the real value of the 
offending. It is arguable that the nature of the financial product traded should 
determine which factor reflects the true value of the offending. 
When a monetary value is involved in assessing criminality, there is a risk that 
some offenders may be unfairly disadvantaged by their relatively privileged
financial position. For instance, to compare the amounts of money invested and 
profited in Mr Doff’s and Mr Rivkin’s cases, Mr Doff invested $55,855 in 
acquiring 20,000 Qantas shares, while Mr Rivkin spent $139,000 on 50,000 
Qantas shares. Clearly, Mr Rivkin ventured two and a half times the amount Mr 
Doff did. However, these nominal numerical measurements can hardly quantify 
one’s criminality. The amount of money an offender can afford and is willing to 
spend (or has at their disposal) depends on each offender’s financial position at 
the time of trading. Mr Doff may have invested 5%of his total assets in acquiring 
the 20,000 Qantas shares, while the $139,000 spent by Mr Rivkin may have 
represented less than 1% of his total assets. Offenders’ financial states vary. It is 
very difficult to propose that one offender is less criminally culpable than another 
because he or she has ventured less money. Moreover, in Rietbergen and Levi’s 
case, it was considered a relevant sentencing factor that Mr Levi did not spend all 
his money on insider trading. Mr Levi only purchased enough shares to cover his 
previous capital losses.
This paper takes the view that a relatively modest monetary worth of shares traded
does not equate to lower criminality. Further from this idea, when assessing 
insider trading offenders’ criminality, the amount of money involved in each case 
                                                          
23 Ibid.
24 Doff’s case [31].
25 Front-running: Hartman’s case, de Silva’s case; Hill & Kamay’s case.
26 Kamay’s appeal [33], [35].
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should be given only limited weight. An offender’s trading behaviour is a more 
appropriate indicator of his/her criminality. 
2 Source and Quality of Information
The sources of the relevant inside information were considered in all cases; these 
sources also affected the quality of that information. If the information is reliable, 
offenders can trade with confidence and certainty. Further, it was considered an 
aggravating factor where an offender had actively sought out the information. If 
the information was involuntarily communicated to an offender, it was regarded 
as a mitigating factor. 
In terms of quality, information about takeovers is of the highest degree because 
it can have immediate effects on the relevant companies’ share prices. Moreover, 
the quality of information about imminent takeovers is higher than that about
possible takeovers.27 This does not mean that other information is of low quality. 
For example, information only available to the Board was held to be of high 
quality,28 a letter received from an auditor concerning the company’s ability to 
remain solvent was held to be of high quality,29 and unpublished official data was 
held to be of high quality.30 Moreover, if an offender did not have full access to 
the information,31 or if the information was known by a couple of people, then 
the quality of that information decreases.32
3 Course of Conduct
If an offender has committed several acts of insider trading over a period of time, 
it is considered an aggravating factor. In other words, the offence is less serious 
if an offender has committed only one act of insider trading.33 Roll-up charges 
involve more than one incidence of criminal conduct, and hence the criminality 
involved in this kind of charge is greater than that for a charge with only a single 
episode of criminal conduct.34 Another aggravating factor is active concealment. 
If an offender planned elaborate structures to conceal their trades, the criminality 
of his/her offence increases. 
4 Breach of Trust
If the inside information was acquired in a professional setting, it generally 
involves a breach of trust, which is an aggravating factor. The importance of the 
principles of confidentiality and trust was stated in Hartman’s case as follows:
                                                          
27 Joffe & Stromer’s case [101].
28 Gay’s case; Vizard’s case.
29 Hall’s case.
30 Hill & Kamay’s case.
31 Dalzell’s case.
32 O’Brien’s case.
33 Doff’s case; Stephenson’s case; Tan’s case; Hebbard’s case; Graham’s case; Reddell’s case; 
Ang’s case; Gay’s case; Luong’s case; Turner’s case; Breen’s case.
34 Hill & Kamay’s case [37]; Woodland’s case.
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The principles of confidentiality and trust are fundamental to the 
operation of many commercial transactions. As the applicant’s employer 
recognised, advance knowledge by its employees of proposed trades of 
a significant kind required, as a matter ofௗtrust, thatௗthey remain in the 
realm of confidentiality.35
People who receive inside information are expected to conform to ‘exacting 
standards of honesty’.36 Hence, the criminality of an offence increases when the 
offender’s action demonstrates a significant departure from professional 
standards.37
5 Definition of ‘True Insider’
A subset of this group of offenders who are deemed to have breached the trust 
associated with their profession is known as ‘true insiders’. However, courts have 
not been clear about the definition of ‘true insider’. Some courts treated the term 
to mean only people who were entrusted with the inside information,38 while 
other courts treated it to include everybody who was in a position of trust.39 The 
latter is generally known as corporate insiders or corporate employees. The 
confusion is partly caused by the name of the provision, ‘the insider trading 
prohibition’, which prevents anyone (not only corporate insiders) from trading on 
privileged information. The reason why true insiders can cause greater damage to 
the market is because they have greater access to inside information.40 Therefore, 
the author suggests the adoption of the definition that only those people who are 
entrusted with the inside information are true insiders. This clarification helps to 
distinguish insiders who are entrusted with the inside information from insiders 
who accidently overhear the inside information.
Also, the level of involvement of different types of true insiders and the seniority 
of an employee are both relevant considerations. For example, a corporate 
director has access to the full range of information about the operation of a
company, and his/her misconduct represents a more serious breach of trust.41
6 The Offender’s Relationship with the Securities Industry
Offenders who had existing relationships with the securities industry were held
more culpable than others because they deliberately acted against the law. This 
consideration is to ensure that professionals in the financial industry are punished 
proportionately. 42 For example, Mr Rivkin deliberately acted on the inside 
information, which represented a ‘significant departure from proper standards’,
even though his trading did not involve a breach of trust and the inside 
                                                          
35 Hartman’s appeal.
36 Rivkin’s case.
37 Stephenson’s case [44].
38 Hannes’ case; de Silva’s case.
39 Glynatsis’ appeal.
40 Rietbergen & Levi’s case, 29–30.
41 Dalzell’s case; O’Brien’s case; Zhu’s case.
42 Rivkin’s case.
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information was acquired in a private setting.43 This element partly overlaps with 
the ‘breach of confidence’ factor and ‘knowledge of the insider trading 
prohibition’: the ‘breach of confidence’ factor concerns corporate insiders and 
true insiders; the ‘relationship with the securities industry’ factor concerns 
professionals in the financial service industry; and the ‘knowledge of the insider 
trading prohibition’ factor concerns all offenders.
7 Background and Circumstances of the Offender
The law requires the court to consider the personal circumstances of the offender. 
Courts have considered the age, antecedents, family relationships, health and 
mental conditions of the offender, as well as the health of the offender’s family 
members and other circumstances. As the strength of the punishment increases, 
the offender’s personal circumstances are examined in more detail.
(i) Age
Age was considered in various cases. For offenders around 60 years old, courts 
held that sentencing them to full-time imprisonment would make the situation 
more severe for them.44 However, for offenders in their twenties, youth was not 
given any weight in terms of the determination of the seriousness of the crime 
and general deterrence.45 Courts held that youth does not equate to immaturity;46
rather, it was held that the younger offenders were well-educated and ‘operating 
in the adult sphere of business and commerce in every respect’.47 Moreover, it is 
crucial for courts to consider the need for general deterrence of other young 
adults.48
(ii) Financial Circumstances
Different kinds of financial difficulties were considered in various cases, 
including personal financial stress, family financial crisis and illness-related 
financial difficulties. Some were considered as influential and mitigating 
factors,49 and others were not.50 For example, Glynatsis committed insider trading 
amid his father’s financial crisis. Reference was made to the offender’s cultural
background in that he felt the pressure to help his father through financial 
difficulties. There are no clear cut guidelines as to what kinds of financial 
circumstances qualify as a mitigating factor. 
                                                          
43 Ibid.
44 O’Reilly’s case; Hall’s case; Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: 
Sentencing of Federal Offenders (2006) [6.89].
45 Hartman’s case; Zhu’s case; Kamay’s appeal.
46 Zhu was considered young but mature.
47 Kamay’s appeal; Hartman’s case.
48 Ibid.
49 Glynatsis’ case; Lindskog’s case; O’Reilly’s case.
50 De Silva’s case.
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(iii) Mental Illness
In many cases, offenders’ mental health issues were considered.51 A custodial 
sentence may be more onerous for an offender who is suffering from mental 
illness. In Hartman’s appeal case, the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal (NSWCCA) considered the offender’s mental illness in detail. The court 
referred to the observations made by McClellan CJ at CL in Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa regarding principles developed and applied in 
cases where an offender has a mental illness, intellectual handicap or other mental 
problems.52 Among the five principles summarised by McClellan CJ at CL, two 
aspects were found to be relevant in Hartman’s case:
Where the state of a person’s mental health contributes to the commission 
of the offence in a material way, the offender’s moral culpability may be 
reduced. Consequently, the need to denounce the crime may be reduced 
with a reduction in the sentence. [Authorities omitted.]
It may also have the consequence that an offender is an inappropriate 
vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which 
would otherwise have been imposed. [Authorities omitted.]
Although motivated by self-enrichment, Mr Hartman was found to be partly 
motivated by his gambling addiction. NSWCCA acknowledged that the offender 
was suffering from long-term depression throughout the period in which he 
conducted insider trading. Additionally, it was held that the offender sought relief 
from his depression in gambling and trading activity, which ‘was in fundamental 
respects a form of highly leveraged gambling akin to the other types of gambling 
in which he had engaged’. 53 Therefore, the offender was not an ideal 
representative for general deterrence. Similar conclusions were drawn in Joffe’s 
case and Woodland’s case.
Moreover, the difficulties involved in obtaining adequate psychiatric treatment 
for inmates were detailed in Hartman’s appeal case.54 For Mr Rivkin, it was 
submitted that a full-time custodial sentence would be life threating. Sadly, the 
offender still committed suicide shortly after he was released from periodic 
detention. In fact, he attempted suicide several times while in custody and spent 
most of his sentences in prison hospital.55
Mental illness cannot be used as an excuse to escape imprisonment. Only when 
there is a causal link between an offender’s mental condition and his/her trading
do that offender’s mental issues became relevant. Subsequently, the need for 
                                                          
51 Woodland’s case; Mr Joffe; Rivkin’s case; Hartman’s case; de Silva’s case; Zhu’s case.
52 Hartman’s appeal [81]; Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 
194.
53 Hartman’s appeal [91].
54 Hartman’s appeal.
55 Kate McClymont and Jordon Baker, ‘Stockbroker Rene Rivkin Found Dead’, The Age (online) 2 
May 2005 <http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Stockbroker-Rene-Rivkin-found-
dead/2005/05/01/1114886254817.html>.
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general deterrence is moderated, since that offender is an inappropriate vehicle 
for general deterrence. 
(iv) HIV and Resulting Mental Health Issues
In de Silva’s case, the offender was tested as HIV positive. Prior to his sentencing, 
Mr de Silva served six months in jail for having breached his restraining order.56
The offender described his experience of prison as ‘frightening’,57 ‘stressful’,58
and ‘he was constantly concerned that he would be target[ed] because of his 
sexuality and his HIV status’.59 Buddin J referred to observations made in R v 
Penalosa-Manoz in which NSWCCA held that an offender with HIV ‘is likely to 
be subjected to harassment from other prisoners’.60 Moreover, ‘imprisonment 
creates considerable stress for inmates’,61 which can ‘significantly comprise the 
body’s immune system and its capacity to resist the spread of the illnesses’.62 In 
that case, NSWCCA recognised that imprisonment for a person who has HIV will 
be more onerous than would otherwise be the case.63 It was recognised by Buddin 
J that the fear of being mistreated by other inmates causes anxiety.64
Besides HIV, Mr de Silva suffered from severe depression to the point of 
hospitalisation, as well as anxiety and sleep disturbances. 65 The offender’s 
statement about his experience in jail indicated that, after becoming aware of his 
illness in 2005, his psychological distress became most prevalent. It was reported 
that he did not know how to cope with his HIV diagnosis, and he realised he could 
not pay for medical treatment. In addition, the offender feared that his HIV status 
might affect his ability to become an Australian permanent resident. Mr de Silva 
came to Australia in September 2004, and was diagnosed in September 2005 with 
HIV.66 In January 2006, Dr Sternhill at St Vincent’s Hospital diagnosed him as
‘suffering from a prolonged Adjustment Disorder with anxious and depressed 
mood’. 67 The offender also had both narcissistic and obsessional personality 
traits, and the doctor observed that the offender’s panic symptoms related to the 
HIV diagnosis.68 A report detailed the management process for inmates who have 
HIV, 69 which is a relatively involved and costly process. Further, evidence 
showed that other inmates had harassed Mr de Silva during his earlier sentence 
and ‘nurses did not appreciate his condition where he was sent.’70 The offender 
was to be deported immediately upon release. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
56 De Silva’s case.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid [69].
65 Ibid [42].
66 Ibid [34].
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid [35].
69 Ibid [44].
70 Ibid [43], [70].
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of New South Wales (NSWSC) held that Mr de Silva was motivated to enrich 
himself, which took precedence over his personal circumstances. 
(v) Physical Health
Similarly, offenders’ physical health issues were considered in various cases. 
Mostly, physical health issues were not considered as a mitigating factor, even in 
the case of Mr de Silva, who, as described above, was HIV positive.
(vi) Serving Sentence in a Foreign Country
Three cases involved issues of residency: O’Reilly’s case, Lindskog’s case, and 
de Silva’s case. Mr Lindskog, originally from Sweden, was married with a child 
in Australia. Hence, this consideration did not concern him. In O’Reilly’s case
and de Silva’s case, both offenders’ family members lived outside Australia. The 
offenders were to be jailed in Australia, living amidst a foreign culture and 
isolated from any outside contact.71 This issue was considered in both cases, but 
with different outcomes. In O’Reilly’s case, the Supreme Court of Victoria (VSC) 
held that a term of actual imprisonment in Australia would be more burdensome 
since the offender could not receive any emotional support from his family.72 In 
de Silva’s case, Buddin J considered the fact that the offender ‘will be serving his 
sentence in a foreign country away from the support of his family’.73 However, 
the sentencing judge subsequently referred to the observations made in R v 
Ferrer-Esis. When offenders deliberately come to Australia to commit a serious 
crime, ‘[they are] obliged to remain incarcerated in this country’.74 The author 
believes that this finding does not apply to de Silva’s case. Mr de Silva did not 
deliberately come to Australia to commit insider trading. Given Mr de Silva’s 
health condition, incarceration in a foreign country without any outside contact 
would certainly be distressing. 
(vii) Education
Offenders’ education levels are not taken as relevant factors in sentencing insider 
trading offences. However, offenders’ initiative to attend training programs while 
in custody is regarded as an indication that they are making progress in prison. In 
Hartman’s appeal case, the kinds of activities Mr Hartman participated in while 
in custody were listed in detail. Mr Hartman, among other activities, completed a 
TAFE real estate course and joined a prison-based addiction program. Mr 
Hartman’s good behaviours provide first-hand evidence regarding how insider 
trading offenders are likely to behave while in jail.
                                                          
71 R v Ferrer-Esis (1991) 55 A Crim R 231, 239.
72 O’Reilly’s case.
73 De Sivla’s case.
74 R v Ferrer-Esis (1991) 55 A Crim R 231, 239.
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8 Previous Good Character of an Offender
The majority of insider trading offenders demonstrated prior good character. A 
couple of offenders had old charges against them, which were mostly considered
irrelevant.75 Unlike in traditional criminal cases, an offender’s good character is 
given only limited weight in insider trading cases. Courts have consistently held 
that it should not be given significant weight as a mitigating factor because it is 
offenders’ previous good character that enabled them to occupy a position of
trust.76
For most convicted offenders, their offences were characterised as ‘a moment of 
madness in an otherwise exemplary life’, ‘out of character behaviour’, and ‘only 
a blemish’. However, as noted, it is an offender’s prior good character that has
placed them in positions of trust that enable them to carry out insider trading. If 
their offences breach that trust, their prior good character should not be given any 
considerable weight. Sometimes, their good character can be an aggravating 
factor ‘where victims have been led to trust the offender because of his or her 
good character or reputation’.77 However, a problem arises when an offence did 
not involve a breach of trust of a position that the offender had attained through 
his/her good character. This is the case for most tippees.78
In Vizard’s case, the Federal Court referred to findings made in Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB Transmission and Distribution 
Ltd (No 2—Distribution Transformers):
Corporate crimes are usually committed to accumulate wealth and power and are 
almost always the result of deliberate and calculated conduct … [F]or this kind 
of offence, it is the nature of the offence rather than the character of the offender 
that should be the principal consideration for the punishment to be imposed.79
Even though insider trading offenders have usually obtained their positions due 
to good character, this does not mean that good character is less important in the 
white-collar criminal sentencing process. Prior good character means that they 
were law-abiding citizens who paid their taxes and made their contributions to 
the society; not to mention most insider trading offenders demonstrated charitable 
personalities. Had they committed traditional crimes in the same subjective 
circumstances, it is certain that their prior good character would have been given 
sufficient weight. Why should insider trading be different? Nevertheless, an 
offender’s breach of trust has already been considered an aggravating factor in 
previous considerations. 
                                                          
75 O’Brien’s case; Mr Levi in Rietbergen & Levi’s case; Bateson’s case; Hall’s case. Kirby J 
considered Mr Hall’s previous charge that he was found to have acted dishonestly in the exercise 
of his powers in a previous civil proceeding brought by ASIC.
76 Kamay’s appeal.
77 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time, above n 45 [6.90].
78 Tippees: Mr Tan, Mr Luong, Mr Levi, Mr Stromer, Mr Hill.
79 Vizard’s case [37] cited Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB 
Transmission and Distribution Ltd (No 2—Distribution Transformers) (2002) ATPR 41–872.
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Another aspect of insider trading offenders’ good character is their discipline. 
Most, if not all, achieved highly in school, both academically and in sport, 
demonstrating their discipline and persistence. Hartman’s behaviours in jail
demonstrates that insider trading offenders do not need to be rehabilitated in jail.
The author believes that all offenders should be entitled to the benefit of their 
previous good character. Concerns were expressed in Vizard’s case that if all such 
factors were to be taken into account, the sentence imposed might be too lenient. 
This concern links to extra-curial punishments; if collateral punishments are 
recognised, there is no such thing as a too-lenient sentence for convicted white-
collar criminals.
9 Motivations of the Offender
Three types of motivations for committing insider trading were considered: 
maximising personal wealth,80 protecting family interests,81 and acting in the 
interests of a third party.82 When an offender acted on inside information to 
maximise his/her wealth, this was considered the most serious motivation. If an 
offender was convicted on the ‘ought to have known’ basis for trading on the 
inside information, his/her offending was considered less serious than that of a 
deliberate offending.83 However, in Khoo’s case, the fact that Mr Khoo was 
sentenced on the basis that he should have known that his friends would act on 
the inside information was not regarded as a mitigating factor. 
When an offender acted to protect the interests of a family member, courts held 
differently in various scenarios. While two cases held that it was in the offenders’ 
favour that they acted in the interests of their family members,84 the other two 
cases found that the offenders’ positions were similar to self-enrichment.85 In 
Glynatsis’s case, NSWCCA held that the commission of offences for the benefit 
of others ‘can indicate a less serious level of criminality’,86 and accepted the lower 
court’s finding that ‘[t]he distinction between an offence committed for motives 
of personal greed and committed for the benefit of some other person is real.’87
In Hall’s case, Kirby J concluded that the offender put his own interests and the 
interests of his family ahead of market integrity.88 Hoeben CJ at CL in Glynatsis’s
case pointed out the difference among these cases and stated that, in Hall’s case
and Mackay’s case, beneficiaries indirectly benefited from the offender’s 
actions.89
                                                          
80 Hartman acted in maximising his personal wealth, but his crime was held as partly motivated by 
his gambling addiction. 
81 O’Brien’s case; McKay’s case; Hall’s case; Glynatsis’ case.
82 Graham’s case; Ms Rietbergen in Rietbergen & Levi’s case; Khoo’s case.
83 Hebbard’s case; Gay’s case.
84 O’Brien’s case; Glynatsis’ appeal.
85 Hall’s case; McKay’s case.
86 Glynatsis’ appeal [48]; Dalzell’s case; O’Brien’s case; Lindskog’s case.
87 Glynatsis’ appeal [48].
88 Hall’s case.
89 Glynatsis’ appeal [47].
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For tippers and others who acted in the interest of a third party, courts held 
differently in different cases. For an offender who acted in the interests of his 
clients,90 it was held as a mitigating factor because he was not motivated by self-
enrichment. However, it is not necessary for the prosecutor to establish that 
tippers received any financial gain from communicating the inside information.91
In Khoo’s case, NSWCCA clarified that ‘that is not to say that the commission of 
offences for the benefit of others is a mitigating factor,’92 despite the fact that 
NSWCCA previously found in Glynatsis’s case that ‘trading on behalf of the 
offender’s relatives in an attempt to restore his family’s fortunes was a factor 
operating in his favour’.93 For Ms Rietbergen, the fact that the offender did not 
seek any financial gain for herself was held in favour of the offender.
Among the three types of motivations, self-enrichment is considered the most 
culpable motivation. In addition, the commission of offences for the benefit of 
others is not always a mitigating factor.
10 Hardship of Sanctions
When sentencing a person to jail, courts are obliged to consider whether a term 
of imprisonment would impose exceptional hardship on a third party. To qualify 
for this criterion, offenders need to show that the hardship to the third party is 
extreme and goes beyond the hardship commonly suffered by the spouse or 
children of a person sent to jail. None of the cases examined in this study qualified 
for this element. 
The sentencing judge in Hall’s case examined the requirement established 
regarding ‘the sort of hardship that must be present before it can have an impact 
upon the sentence imposed’. 94 Only exceptional cases can qualify for this 
consideration.95 That a family is deprived of the ‘breadwinner’ does not constitute 
a sufficiently extreme situation.96
11 The Offender’s Knowledge of the Law
Courts also examined the offender’s knowledge of the law. The majority of 
convicted offenders were aware of the insider trading prohibition. When
offenders acted on the information knowing their trading was wrong, courts held 
that their awareness of the law was an aggravating factor. Given insider trading 
offenders’ average education and work background, courts are unlikely to be 
persuaded that offenders were not aware of the insider trading provisions. Even 
when an offender is found to be unaware of insider trading laws, that offender 
                                                          
90 Graham’s case.
91 Khoo’s case 33–34; Salman v United States (Supreme Court of the United States, No 15-628, 6 
December 2016); Rietbergen & Levi’s case.
92 Khoo’s appeal.
93 Khoo’s appeal [78], [92].
94 Hall’s case [114].
95 R v Hinton (2002) 134 A Crim R 286 [31].
96 R v Maslen & Shaw (1995) 79 A Crim R 199, [20].
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most likely has breached his/her company policy by trading on or communicating 
that information.97 For the few offenders who argued that they did not appreciate 
that insider trading was a criminal offence,98 the courts rejected their arguments 
and held that it had no impact on the seriousness of their offending. In Zhu’s case,
the offender argued, and the court rejected, that ‘Chinese culture’ influenced his 
actions. Mr Zhu claimed that, in Chinese culture, he would be deemed a fool if 
he did not act on the inside information to enrich himself.
12 The Influence of Poisonous Work Culture
The influence of poisonous work culture was touched upon in two cases: Zhu’s 
case and Hartman’ case. However, this factor was not considered as a mitigating 
factor in either case. In relation to the offender’s employment environment in 
Hanlong Mining, the sentencing judge in Zhu’s case referred to the point made 
by Simpson J in R v Agius; R v Zerafa that a morally unhealthy work environment 
is relevant to the assessment of the offender’s culpability, but the extent of the 
effect differs in each case.99 In Hartman’s case, NSWCCA commented on the 
lower court judge’s criticism of the practices and values of the finance industry:
His Honour was critical of that segment of the business world that allowed a 
person of the applicant’s youth and immaturity to be beguiled by the enormous 
salaries and rewards that were given to him for what was, as his Honour 
described it, a ‘responsible clerical position’. His Honour adopted 
Dr Hartman’s description of the world in which his son was employed as 
‘plastic’. … While the applicant was still at university, [this world] corrupted 
his values and resulted in him pursuing ‘the high life’ without regard for 
whether or not he was committing criminal offences. His Honour was also 
critical of the lack of effective supervision provided to the applicant. He said 
[authority omitted]:
The temptations are so great and the potential rewards so significant that the 
fall into criminality of individuals is a significant risk.100
Mr Hartman, at the age of 20, began working as an equities dealer at Orion Asset 
Management Limited, and was paid a total of $350,000 in salary and bonuses in 
his last year in employment.101 The enormous compensation was paid for carrying 
out clerical works.102 The sentencing judge further criticised the culture in the 
financial industry:
Overseas holidays and gambling trips to Las Vegas and other casinos, together 
with an expensive luxury motor vehicle, became part of his life … Paying 
$350,000 to a recent graduate in his early twenties carrying out a task of 
modest responsibility underlines the extent to which the values [that] underpin 
our society can be compromised. The values of productive endeavour and 
                                                          
97 Zhu’s case.
98 Stephenson’s case; Dalzell’s case; Bateson’s case; Khoo’s case; Zhu’s case.
99 R v Agius; R v Zerafa [2012] NSWSC 978.
100 Hartman’s case [53].
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
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integrity in dealings and business can easily be lost. This is what happened in 
the case of the offender.103
13 Guilty Plea and Offenders’ Co-operation
Except for three offenders,104 all other offenders pleaded guilty. While courts 
encourage guilty pleas, offenders are treated equally before the criminal law 
regardless of whether or not they plead guilty. A guilty plea can be given a 15% 
to 25% discount in the sentence imposed, depending on the quality of that plea. 
The importance of a guilty plea is multi-fold: (i) insider trading cases are difficult 
to prosecute; (ii) an early guilty plea frees ASIC’s time and resources from a
lengthy investigation; (iii) a guilty plea saves the community the time and costs 
of a trial. Hence, a plea of guilty demonstrates an offender’s willingness to 
facilitate the course of justice. In some cases, a further 10% discount was added 
when an offender pleaded guilty to an offence that was otherwise unlikely to have 
been discovered.105
14 Expression of Remorse
According to the definition of contrition stated in the Australian Law Reform 
Commission’s Report on Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 106 offenders can 
demonstrate contrition in various ways, such as a guilty plea, reparation of 
damages and co-operation with the authorities.107 In all but one case, remorse 
flowed from a guilty plea. The timing of the guilty plea is relevant to the 
assessment of remorse: a late plea can mean little or no contrition on the 
offender’s part.108 Kirby J emphasised the interdependency relationship between 
remorse and acceptance of responsibility: there cannot be any real finding of 
remorse without an acceptance of responsibility. However, in Graham’s case,
despite the fact that the offender entered a guilty plea at the earliest practicable 
opportunity, the County Court of Victoria held that there was no evidence of 
remorse. Another way to demonstrate contrition is through some practical act:109
NSWCCA held that participation in long-term charity work is a practical way to 
show remorse.110
15 Pecuniary Penalty Orders or Fines
Courts can impose a fine or a pecuniary penalty (based on the benefits gained 
from the insider trading) on offenders. For tippers who did not receive any 
financial benefits from tippees’ trading, courts did not impose any form of 
monetary penalty. 111 Otherwise, courts are likely to impose some form of 
                                                          
103 Hartman’s case [50].
104 Doff’s case; Rivkin’s case; Hannes’ case.
105 Hartman’s case; Khoo’s case.
106 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time, above n 45.
107 Ibid [6.50].
108 Woodland’s case; Frawley’s case; Hall’s case.
109 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time, above n 45, [6.46].
110 Hartman’s case.
111 Ms Rietbergen in Rietbergen & Levi’s case; Joffee’s case; Khoo’s case.
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monetary fine, or the forfeiture of profits, except where offenders’ financial 
positions do not allow for the imposition of fines.112
16 Delay in the Prosecution
Delay in the prosecution of insider trading offenders is common and reasonable, 
and was considered in various cases.113 A wide variety of reasons can trigger 
delay, such as appeal114 and companion actions for civil penalties.115 Although 
the delay between the commission of the offence and the laying of charges can 
cause severe stress, courts generally extend a limited degree of leniency to 
offenders because the delay in prosecuting insider trading offenders has been 
regarded as reasonable. In some cases, greater consideration was given to the 
delay, especially when such delay had caused psychological impacts on offenders 
who were suffering from mental illness. In that case, the delay was considered as
a form of punishment.116
17 Extra-curial Punishment
‘Extra-curial’ means beyond court. 117 Extra-curial punishments mean 
punishments that are not imposed by the sentencing court. 118 This type of 
punishment can take place in various forms, such as adverse publicity, loss of 
professional license, adverse effects on personal and family lives, damage to 
offender’s reputation and professional standings, physical health issues and 
mental stress.119 Moreover, it is not uncommon that convicted insider trading 
offenders tend to withdraw from social circles.120 While in some cases, offenders 
were held to have already been punished for their offending through extra-curial 
punishments,121 in most cases the public humiliation experienced by offenders 
was considered as a ‘by-product’ of their offending that could never substitute for 
formal condemnation by society through its courts.122 In other words, the adverse 
publicity suffered by insider trading offenders does not constitute ‘exceptional 
circumstances’.123
The author observes that, as the criminality of offending increases, the weight 
given to extra-curial punishment decreases. If the extra-curial punishment is 
recognised, the sentence passed tends to be on the lighter side of the sanction 
scale. For most offenders sentenced with non-custodial alternatives, extra-curial 
                                                          
112 Dalzell’s case.
113 See the analysis of Figure 3.
114 Hannes’ case.
115 Hall’s case.
116 Joffe & Stromer’s case.
117 The Law Dictionary <http://www.thelawdictionary.org/>.
118 Einfeld v R (2010) 266 ALR 598 [86].
119 See, Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization without 
Incarceration, 44 University of San Francisco Law Review 459 (2010).
120 Graham’s case; Joffe’s case.
121 O’Brien’s case; Graham’s case
122 O’Reilly’s case; Rietbergen & Levi’s case.
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punishments suffered by them were recognised as a form of punishment. 
However, for offenders who were sentenced with custodial sanctions, collateral 
consequences suffered by them were seen as unexceptional and a by-product of 
their offending.124
Basten JA examined the meaning of extra-curial punishment and its application 
in Einfeld v R.125 According to the analysis by Basten JA, extra-curial punishment 
should not include any ‘consideration of the conditions of imprisonment and the 
impact of imprisonment on the particular offender’.126 Should legal consequences
that flow directly from the conviction or the sentence, such as disqualification 
orders, be included in the consideration of extra-curial punishments? Basten JA
concluded that the answer to this question was unclear.
A typical extra-curial punishment could usually refer to punishment suffered by 
offenders in Aboriginal communities.127 Basten JA found that the use of the 
phrase ‘in an expanded sense’ by Whealy J in Rivkin’s case was partly 
inappropriate.128 Disagreeing with Whealy J, Basten JA held that the following 
three factors should not be considered under the heading of ‘extra-curial 
punishment’: (i) loss of previous good standing in the community; (ii) inevitable 
economic impact the conviction may have on one’s livelihood; and (iii) impact 
on one’s family members. Basten JA held that these factors may give rise to the 
issue of double counting and favour those who were previously employed.129
Therefore, Basten JA concluded that only ‘specific changes in one’s legal status 
may properly be considered as extra-curial punishment’.130 The sentencing judge 
further held that ‘the loss of reputation and standing in the community’ resulting
from ‘the revocation of his commission as Queen’s Counsel and the removal of 
[the appellant’s] entitlement to remain on the roll of barristers’ was the most 
significant loss under extra-curial punishment.131
In some cases, the likely consequences of a finding of guilt or a conviction in 
relation to the offence were recognised. The concern with this consideration is 
that it may favour powerful and well-known individuals.
18 Prospects of Rehabilitation and Specific Deterrence
An offender’s prospects of rehabilitation and his/her need for specific deterrence 
are inter-linked. Except for Mr Rivkin, all other offenders were found to have 
good prospects of rehabilitation and were unlikely to re-offend. Those convicted 
of insider trading are unlikely to secure a similar position where they can again 
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have access to price-sensitive information. Hence, there is no need to consider 
specific deterrence for most convicted insider trading offenders.132
Personal deterrence was found to be relevant only in Rivkin’s case, in which he
pleaded not guilty. The sentencing judge held that specific deterrence was
necessary to ensure Mr Rivkin’s rehabilitation because he had refused to accept 
responsibility for his wrongdoing. As Australian Law Reform Commission stated 
in its sentencing report, the ‘degree to which the person has shown contrition … 
may be relevant to the prospect of rehabilitation of … [and] it is also relevant to 
… the purpose of specific deterrence.’133
Since contrition generally flows from a plea of guilty, the absence of a guilty plea 
usually equates to no contrition, which subsequently can affect the assessment of 
the offender’s rehabilitation prospect. Among the three offenders who pleaded 
not guilty, two were found to have good prospects of rehabilitation. 134 For 
Mr Hannes, the sentencing judge rejected the Crown’s submission that the 
offender did not have good prospects of rehabilitation. The Crown based its 
argument on the nature of Mr Hannes’ offence in that it involved ‘a high level of 
deceit’, and the offender had tried to frustrate the investigation into his offence. 
Since ‘[t]he futurity of specific deterrence is highlighted … by the fact that it 
relates to the offender’s conduct after release’,135 the court was correct in holding 
that Mr Hannes had good prospects of rehabilitation.136
19 General Deterrence
General deterrence has a central role in sentencing law and practice.137 General 
deterrence means that sentences imposed on one type of offence can deter others
from committing the same offence. In other words, if the incidence of one offence 
has been declining since the imposition of a series of heavy sentences on that 
offence, then there has been a general deterrence effect. 138 Courts considers
general deterrence as one of the most important factors in sentencing insider 
trading offenders, for its purposes of protecting market integrity and investors’ 
interests.
The importance of general deterrence in insider trading cannot be more highly 
emphasised by the courts. VSC held that white-collar criminals are mostly first-
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time offenders who ‘fear the prospect of incarceration’.139 They are rational, 
profit seeking, and ‘can weigh the benefits of committing a crime against the costs 
of being caught and punished’.140 Therefore, general deterrence is likely to ‘have 
a more profound effect on white collar criminals’. 141 In Khoo’s case, the 
sentencing judge acknowledged the effects of general deterrence on insiders and 
stated:
one might properly assume that given the increase in prosecutions for insider 
trading offences in recent years and the attendant publicity that goes with those 
prosecutions a true insider may be reluctant to personally trade whilst in 
possession of inside information, because to do so may significantly increase 
the chance that they will be detected by the authorities.142
In Graham’s case, the County Court of Victoria held that general deterrence had
already been largely achieved by the public humiliation and adverse publicity.143
The importance of recording a conviction in order to achieve general deterrence 
and public protection was emphasised in various cases.144 However, some courts 
held that ‘the real bite’ of general deterrence takes place only with an actual term 
of imprisonment.145 So far, only mental illness has been used to moderate the 
need for general deterrence.146
However, the author believes that general deterrence has been used as an ultimate 
justification for almost any kind of sentence for insider trading. Glynatsis was 
first sentenced with an Intensive Correction Order, which was deemed inadequate 
on the basis of general deterrence by NSWCCA. This was despite the fact that 
the assessment report described Mr Glynatsis ‘as being at low risk of reoffending 
with his criminogenic needs being in the area of his mental health’.147 Further, in 
Kamay’s appeal, his counsel submitted that Mr Kamay had been ‘sacrificed on 
the altar of general deterrence’.148
When it comes to insider trading, ASIC has been particularly fond of criminal 
prosecutions for their additional deterrent effects. Moreover, the regulator has 
staked its credibility on its ability to maximise deterrence effects for white-collar 
                                                          
139 Kamay’s appeal [53] cited DPP v Gregory (2011) 34 VR 1. For an argument distinguishing 
incarceration from conviction in such cases, see, Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s Martyrdom: The 
Case for Criminalization without Incarceration, 44 University of San Francisco Law Review
459 (2010).
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. For a contrary view offering an economics based theory, see, Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s 
Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization without Incarceration, 44 University of San 
Francisco Law Review 459 (2010).
142 Khoo’s case, 33–34.
143 For details, see Graham’s case
144 Hebbard’s case; Reitbergen & Levi’s case; Bateson’s case.
145 McKay’s case; Zhu’s case; Kamay’s case. For critique of these tendencies, see Mirko Bagaric 
and Sandeep Gopalan, Progressive Alternatives to Imprisonment in an Increasingly Punitive
(and Self-defeating) Society, 40 Seattle Law Review 57–114 (2016)
146 Joffe & Stromer’s case; Hartman’s case.
147 Glynatsis’ case [182].
148 Kamay’s appeal’ [27].
2017                                         … SENTENCING FACTORS IN INSIDER TRADING CASES 133
 
 
criminals. The Financial Services Reform Act 2001 introduced civil penalty 
provisions for insider trading offences.149 However, ASIC has proceeded with 
only a few civil penalty proceedings because the regulator believes that civil 
proceedings have lesser deterrent effects and that ‘the public expect [ASIC] to 
take strong actions against corporate wrongdoers’,150 including insider trading 
offenders. Further, ASIC began actively pursuing criminal charges against insider 
trading offenders after the GFC, partly because regulators worldwide were 
criticised for being too soft on the financial sector. As demonstrated in Figures 1
and 2 of this paper, the majority of convicted cases that occurred after 2006 and 
were finalised after 2010.
In addition, the author believes the over-publicising of insider trading cases is to 
demonstrate to the public that ASIC has been acting effectively to ‘catch all the 
bad guys’ in the commercial world. However, recent scandal in the Australian 
banking sector certainly proves that general deterrence is not as efficient as it 
claims to be for white-collar crimes. This is not to say that absolute general 
deterrence is completely useless. The author believes that general deterrence is 
effective. For the minority who are still contemplating insider trading, however, 
general deterrence does not work. 
After examining the consistency in the application of sentencing factors, the 
following section looks at consistency in the determination of criminality 
regarding different kinds of insider trading activities. 
B Criminality
Prosecutors’ submissions reflect their understandings of the seriousness of each 
offence, which can be observed in the kinds of sanctions the Crown requested for 
each offender in the cases reviewed in this study. This study revealed a high 
matching rate between what the Crown requested for each offender and what the 
Court imposed in the least serious (non-custodial) and the most serious 
(imprisonment) sanction forms. 
In terms of the criminality involved in different trading activities, it was held that 
the criminality of transferring loss is worse than that of making a profit.151 Selling 
shares before the announcement of bad news causes harm not only to the integrity 
of the market, but also to those investors who bought shares in good will. Further,
communicating inside information is the most serious insider trading offence. 
1 Insider Trading Versus Tipping
It is held that tipping is more serious than actual trading on non-public 
information. Courts have held that tipping could cause greater damage to the 
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market than merely trading on that information (while otherwise keeping it 
secret), because the tipper loses control of the information once it is 
communicated. Hence, in a market where information equality is encouraged and 
protected, the dissemination of information to a tippee presents a greater threat to 
market integrity than insider trading does.152 This view was confirmed by the 
National Companies and Securities Commission in their report, Insider Trading 
Legislation for Australia: An Outline of the Issues and Alternatives:
[B]ecause of the ready transmissibility of information, tipping is arguably a 
more serious threat to the integrity of the securities market than trading, for 
the more widespread it becomes the greater will be the potential for 
trading.153
For example, in Joffe’s case, the sentencing judge cited Bellew J in Khoo v R and 
stated that after the tipper ‘had divulged the information he had no control over 
what happened to it or how it was used’.154 NSWCCA concluded that unequal 
dissemination of information caused by tipping affects the attractiveness of the
Australian securities market, which depends on the perception held by investors 
(local and international investors) that the market is an ‘effective regime 
protecting [market] integrity’.155 In R v Fysh (No 4), McCallum J stated that:
Public trust in a fair and transparent market can only be served by immunising 
the market from the prospect of any trading by people on the inside, who have 
the unfair advantage of knowing something the market cannot know. 156
For insiders who possess privileged information, they do not commit any insider 
trading offence unless they trade on that information. However, for insiders who 
accidentally pass inside information to others, they commit insider trading 
offences even if the recipients never trade on that information or talk to anyone 
else about that information. The latter is because, as described above, courts have 
held that communicating inside information poses a greater threat to the market 
than actually trading on that information, as it risks that the information will ‘go
wild’ in the market. This characterisation of tipping is a clear misunderstanding 
of the basic concept of share trading. One of the alleged benefits of insider 
trading, proposed by Henry Manne, is that, by disseminating the information, it
moves share prices towards their accurate value. 157 In addition, there is no 
concrete evidence that insider trading harms the attractiveness of the securities 
market. 158 When information is known by a large group of people who 
subsequently trade on that information, their trading results in adjustments to
share prices and eliminates the advantages associated with non-public 
                                                          
152 Khoo’s appeal [7].
153 National Companies and Securities Commission, Insider Trading Legislation for Australia: An
Outline of the Issues and Alternatives (1986) (‘Anisman Report’) 62. 
154 Joffe & Stromer’s case [106].
155 Khoo’s appeal.
156 R v Fysh (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 1587 [47].
157 Henry G Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966)
158 Ibid.
2017                                         … SENTENCING FACTORS IN INSIDER TRADING CASES 135
 
 
information. In other words, the information becomes public, which increases 
market efficiency. 
2 Tipper Versus Tippee
Courts have uniformly held that the criminalities of tippers are higher than those 
of tippees because their conduct usually involves breaches of trust.159 In Khoo’s 
appeal case, Bellew J of NSWCCA listed seven factors relevant to an assessment 
of the objective seriousness of tipping:
x the nature and importance of the information which was disclosed; 
x the extent of the disclosure;
x whether the offender knew that the person(s) to whom the information 
was disclosed would use it for the purposes of trading and/or profit 
taking;
x the nature and extent of any breach of trust involved in such disclosure;
x whether such disclosure involved any element of sophistication or 
subterfuge;
x whether the offending involved a course of conduct; and
x the extent of any profit made, be it by the offender or by those to whom 
the information was disclosed.
However, in Kamay and Hill’s case, it was held that Mr Kamay, the tippee,
instigated the insider trading scheme and convinced Mr Hill, the tipper, to share 
information with him. From the tipper’s perspective, people create inner social 
circles on trust;160 if tippers unintentionally share inside information with close 
friends, and their friends then exploit that information, tippees should be equally 
or more culpable than the tipper. Therefore, the essence of the argument is that 
‘breach of trust’ is the aggravating factor. In a case involving tippers and tippees,
it is important to examine the motivations of both parties and determine whether 
or not the tippee instigated the tipper’s breach of trust. 
3 When Insider Trading does not Distort the Market
In many cases, the prosecutor conceded that the trading was ‘too modest to have 
any adverse effect on the market.’161 If insider trading does not distort the market, 
then what kind of harm does it do to individual victims? In Kamay v the Queen,162
it was submitted that general deterrence becomes the main sentencing factor to 
‘protect the integrity of the market’ when ‘the insider trading had no distorting 
effect on the market’.163 Moreover, the criminality and penalty will increase if 
insider trading is found to have distorted the market. This argument stems from 
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the market fairness theory.164 Given the fact the law encourages market fairness, 
the prosecutor only needs to prove the person acted on privileged information.
C Summary
This section reviewed the consistency of application of related sentencing factors 
and assessed relevant propositions pertaining to the criminalities of different 
kinds of insider trading. After evaluating the application of each sentencing factor
across different types of sanction options, this study revealed several 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the practice of sentencing insider trading 
offenders, such as the inconsistency in the weight given to the monetary value of 
shares in determining the seriousness of the offending and the definition of true 
insider trading. Moreover, it is not uncommon for insider trading offenders to 
suffer from some form of mental illness, but each case needs to be examined
closely to decide whether the illness contributed to the commission of the offence. 
Another problem revealed is the over-reliance on general deterrence.
IV CONCLUSION AND REFORM PROPOSAL
By undertaking a thorough review of the sentencing remarks of 40 insider trading 
cases (37 criminal and 3 civil cases), this paper presented an overview of the 
distribution of convicted insider trading during the examination period, assessed 
the consistency in the application of each sentencing factor in convicted insider 
trading cases and civil cases, reviewed the determination of criminalities of 
different kinds insider trading activities, and discusses a number of issues in 
current sentencing practice including (i) the criminalities of trading and tipping; 
(ii) mens rea of tippers and tippees; (iii) the weight given to the amount of profit 
made and the amount of money invested; (iv) the definition of true insider; (v) 
mental and physical health of the offender; (vi) previous good character of the 
offender; (vii) recognisance of extra-curial punishment. The key problem 
revealed is the over-reliance on general deterrence, which is expensive and 
contributes to the problem of over-criminalisation. Furthermore, this paper
pointed out another key issue in insider trading laws and proposed that the name 
of the prohibited activity, ‘insider trading’, be changed to ‘dealing with privileged 
information’. 
A Reforming the Title of ‘The Insider Trading Prohibitions’
In the Corporations Act 2001, Part 7.10 of Chapter 7 deals with various kinds of 
market misconduct relating to financial products and financial services. The 
insider trading prohibitions are set out in Division 3 of Part 7.10 and consist of 
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three prohibitions: the trading prohibition, the procuring prohibition and the 
communication prohibition. Australian law on insider trading applies to insiders 
and outsiders. In other words, defendants do not need to be corporate insiders. As 
Ramsay and Lei stated in their paper, ‘the name “insider trading” has become a 
misnomer … It has been described as more a law about “trading with 
informational advantages”’.165
The definition of ‘insider trading’ varies among different disciplines. In legal 
research, insider trading means any trading based on or any communication of 
privileged information.166 In economics and finance, insider trading means that 
corporate insiders trade on their company shares,167 which can be legal or illegal 
depending on the circumstances.168 To avoid confusion, the author proposes that 
the name of Division 3 of Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) be 
amended from ‘The insider trading prohibitions’ to ‘Dealing with privileged 
information’.
First, the word ‘insider’ has different meanings in different social and academic 
settings. The discrepancy in the definitions of insider has caused great confusion 
in the understanding of insider trading among the general public, and hinders 
cross-disciplinary applications of empirical studies involving insiders and insider 
trading. The dictionary definition of the word ‘insider’ is ‘a person within a group 
or organisation, especially someone privy to information unavailable to 
others’.169 That is to say that an insider is a member of a group or organisation. 
However, in legal dictionary, the definition of ‘insider’ is ‘a director or officer of 
a corporation or the person with at least 10 per cent of the stock’,170 which is 
almost identical to the financial definition of ‘insider’. In finance, insider means 
‘a director or senior officer of a company, as well as any person or entity that
beneficially owns more than 10 per cent of a company’s voting shares’.171 Most 
economic and finance studies employ the term of ‘corporate insider’ to avoid 
confusion.
Second, Australian insider trading prohibitions are not concerned with ‘who 
provided the information’. 172 In addition, the ‘connection to the company 
requirement’ is not required in establishing a contravention against the insider 
trading prohibitions.173
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Finally, the term ‘insider trading’ is a loaded phrase, charged with negative 
emotions, and implicitly directed at trading in the securities market by a person 
who is a member of the corporate world. However, this emotional loading is not 
the intention of the law.174 Australian insider trading law seeks to ensure market 
fairness, that is, ‘all participants having equal access to relevant information’.175
Therefore, the title ‘dealing with privileged information’ is more consistent with 
the legislative purpose and it switches the focus from corporate insiders to all 
people who have access to privileged information.
The author makes the following three suggestions regarding the insider trading 
prohibition in the Corporations Act 2001:
1. Change the title of Division 3 of Part 7.10 to ‘Dealing with privileged 
information’;
2. Substitute ‘inside information’ with ‘privileged information’;176
3. Remove the term ‘the insider’ and, if necessary, use the term ‘the 
information possessor’.177
Insider trading law is a controversial area. Due to the covert nature of insider 
trading, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the law. We cannot know the 
real scope of the practice of insider trading and are unable to accurately identify 
the potential offenders. In future research, it would be beneficial to interview 
convicted insider trading offenders to gain their feedback on the long-term impact
of ASIC’s action on their lives, and to determine whether or not the law deterred
them from commiting insider trading. 
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